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FOREWORD 
THE CONSTITUTION IN EXILE: 
IS IT TIME TO BRING IT IN FROM THE COLD? 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNEt 
Exile n. la: Enforced removal from one's native country by authori-
tative decree; banishment [from Latin eXili1l11l, from fotlll, one who is 
exiled].l 
INTRODUcrION 
When Professors Christopher Schroeder and Jefferson Powell 
organized this second annual public law conference at Duke Univer-
sity, I was three thousand miles away in California, a visitor at the 
University of California, Los Angeles. Professor Schroeder's invita-
tion to provide the keynote address for the conference arrived by e-
mail out of the blue. It identified the general question the conference 
would examine in two days of panel discussions. The title was to be 
"The Constitution in Exile," and the question to be addressed was, 
"Is it time to bring it in from the cold?" Professor Schroeder added 
some details on the time, place, and possible panel participants but he 
said little more to elaborate on the subject at hand. 
Copyright © 2001 by William W. Van Alstyne. 
t William R & Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke Unh'ersity School of Law. This 
Foreword is based on the keynote address of the Constitution in Exile conference. hosted by the 
Program in Public Law at Duke University School of Law on October 5-7.2000. 
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DlcnONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 460 (William Morris 
ed., 8th prtg. 1971). 
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To one so removed from the conference planning, as I had been 
while at UCLA, it was difficult to know just what to do. Certainly, I 
felt grateful to my colleagues for asking me to provide the keynote 
remarks. But I was far from certain that the way I might construe the 
subject of the conference-even to form first thoughts, much less to 
undertake a keynote address-could fit with what they had in mind. 
What were they talking about? Had I missed something along the 
way? What was one to make of the topic, especially given the way it 
was framed? And how was one to go about preparing some useful 
keynote remarks unless one had some coherent idea of just what the 
topic meant? 
Was I to presume that the Constitution somehow had been ex-
iled, put out of the country by some kind of authoritative decree? 
When did this happen? By whom was it done? Was it even true? 
Given the extremely active role of the Constitution as it seemed to 
me to be from my office at UCLA, the claim of the Constitution in 
exile seemed to be a challengeable idea.2 Could I usefully frame a 
2. Consider merely the following brief comparisons, even as they might serve to furnish 
substantial grist for such an address. First, as virtually every student of American constitutional 
history knows, more than a half-century passed between Marbllry v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 180 (1803), the first case holding an act of Congress unconstitutional, and Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857), the second case to do so. In other words, during the first seven 
decades of the United States after ratification of the Constitution (1789-1859), only Iwice was the 
Constitution applied by the Supreme Court in a manner invalidating an act of Congress. Yet, there 
was no widely held notion that the Constitution was therefore "in exile," despite this appearance of 
merely feeble use of the Constitution by the Court, in terms of checking congressional enactments 
as either unauthorized or in defiance of some part of the Bill of Rights. 
Next, as against that history, one might compare a single week in our own time; indccd. 
one might compare a mere three consecutive days in June, 1997 (the last three days of the Supreme 
Court's 1996 Term). On Wednesday, June 25, 1997, the Court struck down parts of !lIe Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 
U.S. 507,536 (1997) (holding Congress had exceeded its legislative autltority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The following day, the Court struck down major provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) 
(holding several provisions void under the FIrst Amendment). The Court completed its tenn on 
Friday by striking down an enforcement provision of tlte Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act, 18 U.S.c. § 922(s)(2). Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-25 (1997) (holding tltat Con-
gress had exceeded its legislative authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 (the Commerce 
Clause) and under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (the Necessary and Proper Clause». Three days, 
three separate acts of Congress, each rejected by tlte Supreme Court, and each rejected on differ-
ent constitutional grounds. Even during the early New Deal years that produced the alleged crisis 
on the Court-before Roosevelt restaffed the Supreme Court (beginning with the appointment of 
William O. Douglas)-never had three different acts of Congress fallen before tlte Court in so 
short a stretch. Just since 1995, moreover, twenty-six different federal enactments have been found 
constitutionally wanting by the Supreme Court. (For a complete listing, see Seth P. Waxman, De-
fending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074 n.8 (2001». "The Constitution in Exile?" Not if one 
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questioning keynote address in those terms? If I could, should I ac-
cept the invitation and take on that particular task, i.e., to challenge 
the very premise of the conference for which this was to be the key-
note address? 
Possibly, but it seemed to me at once that any such approach was 
likely to be misspent, not to mention unwelcome as well. After all, the 
question posed for the conference did not invite remarks of that unre-
sponsive kind. Rather, the Constitution "in exile" was a given. The 
matter at hand before the house was not whether the Constitution 
was, or should be, in exile. It was, rather, whether the Constitution 
should be "brought in from the cold," i.e., returned from exile in some 
manner or degree. In brief, the challenge was not an open-ended invi-
tation to quibble with the premise of the conference. Rather, it was to 
take up a provocative thesis along quite a different line of address. 
Were circumstances sufficiently different since the time the Constitu-
tion was placed in exile (whenever that might have been) that it might 
now be let loose once again? Was this not the topic the conference 
would examine? Obviously it was, and neither more nor less. 
The overall subject, and object, of the conference, though still 
puzzling to me, gradually emerged to come more clearly into view. 
Buried in the background was the suggestion that at some earlier 
point in our national life the Constitution, under the administration of 
the Supreme Court, had taken on a rather menacing mien, something, 
say, like a Napoleonic complex, an overreaching authority, intrusive, 
were to judge by these particular comparisons. Rather, one might think. "The Constitution Ratlr 
pant," ferocious, at large, virtually devouring the legislative branch in the jaws of the judicillIY. 
Yet, to be sure, there might be a far simpler explanation for these differences., i.e .. those 
respecting the greater frequency with which acts of the current Congress have been found wanting 
on constitutional grounds than those enacted in the ClIIly years. Perhaps it is merely the case not 
only that far fewer bills tended to get enacted by ClIIly Congresses (far fewer, that is, than the vastly 
larger number now passed virtually each new session whenever Congress meets), but that early 
Congresses may well have legislated with significantly greater regard for constitutional boundaries, 
than "poll-driven" members in Congress are inclined to observe today. See, e.g., MEG 
GREENFIELD, WASHINGTON 8 (2001) ("These are people who don't seem to Ihoe in the world so 
much as to inhabit some point on graph paper, whose coordinates are (sideways) the political spec-
trum and (up and down) the latest ovemight poll figures."). See gmerally DAVID P. CURRIE, UtE 
CoNsrmJTION IN CoNGRESS: UtE FEoERALtST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997); DAVID P. CURRIE, 
UtE CoNsrmJTION IN CoNGRESS: UtE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001). If so, that difference 
may itself go quite a long way in e>.-plaining why so many more o[ tOOay's sprawling national laws 
will inevitably bring a (careless) Congress into more frequent collision not merely "'ith the Court 
but, rather, with the Constitution itself. It is, perhaps, less the Court or the Constitution that may 
warrant critical review in symposia of this sort, and much more a Congress that behaves cver morc 
self-aggrandizingly in the manner of the leviathan state. At least it may be a thought one might 
consider worth exploring, though it will not be pursued here. 
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arbitrary, and damaging to democratic institutions.3 And that it had 
on that account been rightly "exiled," even as Napoleon was rightly 
removed from his country for the devastation he had wrought in tak" 
ing unto himself an emperor's robes. 
Assuming it was so, perhaps I was being invited simply to recall 
the circumstances, to reset the stage for the conference in the keynote 
address.4 In that case, the real question was this: even with the pas-
sage of time, were circumstances now sufficiently different to warrant 
any change? If not, did it appear nonetheless that the current Su-
preme Court-the untrustworthy Rehnquist Court-was flirting with 
the dubious notion of letting loose this exiled Constitution still again? 
If so, was this tentative disinterment of the exiled Constitution neces-
sarily a good idea? Or, even as one might find already implied by way 
of the answer from the very manner in which the question had been 
posed for this conference, might that be a naive and even a dangerous 
mistake? So, more bluntly, evidently this was the idea: whether now 
to uncage the Constitution-those parts generally and previously re-
garded as having been rightly sent into exile and removed from judi-
cial activism-or leave well enough alone. Presumably, the confer-
ence participants would discuss matters along these lines. 
And in fact, so it appeared the agenda was expected to be for the 
conference. For soon following our initial e-mail correspondence, 
Professor Schroeder responded to my inquiry about the inspiration 
for the conference title, by referring to a recent book review by Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg.s And in that review, Judge Ginsburg provided a 
number of examples to make his point of the Constitution in exile, as 
he deemed it to be. As his first example, Judge Ginsburg referred fa-
vorably to the nondelegation doctrine. The doctrine, even as Judge 
3. The period would include the first thirty.five years of the twentieth century, the judicially 
"interventionist" decades, concluding with the withdrawal of economic·interventionist judicial 
review, signaled first by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 521-39 (1934) (holding state regulation 
of milk prices consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment), and then by United Stales v. Darby, 
312 U.S. 100, 118-23 (1941) (considering it within Congress's powers to establish labor standards 
for employees producing goods for interstate commerce). 
4. The task would be the easy one of parading horrible cases of judicial excess. Obligatory 
examples would tritely include such cases as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking 
down a state law that prevented bakers from working more than sixty hours in a week or more 
than ten hours in a day), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269-77 (1918) (deeming uncon-
stitutional a law that banned interstate commerce in goods manufactured in yiolation of certain 
child labor regulations). 
5. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, No.1, 1995, at 83 (re-
viewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WrrnourREspoNSlBIUTY: How CONGRESS AnUSES 
TIiE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993». 
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Ginsburg usefully recalled it, is simply the familiar idea that when 
laws are made, Congress must make them, even as the Constitution 
straightforwardly seems to require.6 
Judge Ginsburg then noted, however, that "for 60 years the non-
delegation doctrine has existed only as part of the Constitution-in-
exile.,,7 And he declared that much the same also held true for a 
number of other structural features and clauses of the Constitution, 
including "the doctrines of enumerated powers,s [and] unconstitu-
tional conditions,9 and substantive due process, and their textual 
6. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1, cL 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be \'CSted in a 
Congress •. .. ") (emphasis added). Note, as Judge Ginsburg surely would urge, that Article I, Sec-
tion 1, Oause 1 does not declare that: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress and in such agencies or departments as Congress may establish ami to which it may dele-
gate such portions of its power to make laws as it deems appropriate so to delegate to them." Thus, 
there being no such "and" clauses, Congress is given no power to sport away its responsibilities. 
however eagerly it would, if it could, do precisely that. 
7. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 84. 
8. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264, 3tJ7 (1981) 
(Rebnquist, J., concurring): 
It is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note Umt one of the 
greatest "fictions" of our federal system is tbat the Olngress exercises only those powers 
delegated to it •..• The manner in which this Olurt bas construed Ule Commerce 
Oause amply illustrates the extent of this fiction. 
Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89 (1907) ("LT]he proposition that there are legislative pow-
ers ... not ex-pressed in the grant of powers [to Congress]. is in direct conflict \\ith the doctrine that 
this is a government of enumerated powers."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) 316.423 
(1819) (Marshall, CJ.): 
[S]bould [C]ongress, under the pretext of executin$ its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the [national] government ••• it would become the 
painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to 
say, that such an act was not the law of the land. 
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) (Marshall. CJ.) (,,[Ulnder a constitution 
conferring specific powers, the power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised."); 
ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 452 (1919) (remarks of John Marshall dur-
ing the Virginia ratification debates): 
If ... [Olngress] were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated. it 
would be considered by the [national] judges as an infringement of the Constitution they 
are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdic-
tion. They would declare it void. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("'The powers dele-
gated by the ... Constitution to the federal government are few and defined."). 
9. For an early exanlple of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a means of limiting 
government-imposed burdens on enterprises doing business within a state by threatening to cut off 
certain privileges unless the enterprise would meet the state's demands, sec Frost ". Railroad 
Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). The Court in Frost noted that: 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation wbich. by 
words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the 
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cousins, the Necessary and Proper, Contracts, Takings, and Com-
merce Clauses."'o Judge Ginsburg then went on to conclude his rueful 
observations in the following, quite eloquent, manner: "The memory 
of these ancient exiles, banished for standing in opposition to unlim-
ited government, is kept alive [only] by a few scholars who labor on in 
the hope of a restoration, a second coming of the Constitution of lib-
erty-even if perhaps not in their own lifetimes."u 
Plainly, in all of this, Judge Ginsburg was writing in praise, cer-
tainly not in criticism, of these exiled ("banished") parts of the Con-
stitution. These clauses and doctrines clearly were, in his thinking, 
among the most vital parts of that document-valued parts that, in his 
view, stand (or stood) "in opposition to unlimited government.,,12 
And they are crucial (albeit now neglected) parts of "the Constitution 
of liberty" as against the leviathan state.13 So the thesis is thus laid 
out. 
But others-perhaps most of those in the academy (though many 
also on the courts)-fervently disagree with Judge Ginsburg.'4 Indeed, 
in remembering the past, they distance themselves from Judge Gins-
burg and other judges of his ilk. For unlike Judge Ginsburg, they re-
gard these constitutional doctrines and provisions in particular, at 
least as the Supreme Court formerly applied them (i.e., before their 
"exile"), as representing only the worst features of the Constitution, 
virtual black holes of antiprogressive constitutional despair. 
The revival of these doctrines and clauses, accordingly, these par-
ticipants reasonably could be expected to declare, might very well 
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state 
threatens otherwise to withhold. 
ld. For a case arguably exiling (i.e., virtually abandoning) the doctrine in dealing with Congress's 
power to spend with strings attached, on the other hand, see South Dakota v. Do/e, 483 U.S. 203, 
211-12 (1987) (approving an authorization to withhold some federal highway funds from states 
that permit persons under twenty-one to purchase or possess alcoholic beverages). 
10. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 84. 
11. ld. 
12 ld. 
13. ld. 
14. So, for example, the New York Times recently reported on a virtual seminar conducted by 
Laurence Tribe and Cass Sunstein to urge solid Democratic Senate resistance to judicial nominees 
holding views of the sort reflected in Judge Ginsburg's book review. Neil A. Lewis, Washington 
Talk: Democrats Readying for Judicial Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at A19; see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 (presenting the same 
argument for Democratic Senate resistance); Robin Toner, Interest Groups Set for Battle On a SII-
preme Court Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at Al (arguing, similarly, for Democratic Senate 
resistance, advanced by Bruce Ackerman et al.). 
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represent a "second coming," even as Judge Ginsburg suggested. If 
so, however, it would be far less likely in their view to be a second 
coming of liberty, as Judge Ginsburg opined, and far more likely. 
rather, to be a second coming of some nightmare shambling beast-a 
second coming of the dread apocalyptic sort that William Butler 
Yeats described in his famous poem of that very name.lsNecessarily. 
they want no part of that second coming, and most certainly, no part 
of any campaign to revive these exiled parts of the Constitution, such 
as they are. Presumably the papers gathered for the conference 
would-and will-reflect rival positions, some supporting, others de-
ploring, Judge Ginsburg's proposal and the positive description he 
presented of the particular "exiled" clauses and doctrines enumerated 
in his review. 
Here, however, in my own remarks, I want to come to the subject 
from a somewhat different point of view than may be reflected in the 
various papers prepared for this conference. A suitable way of 
providing that view, I think, may begin with an ancient but suitably 
famous quote by a suitably famous jurist. And so I mean in the next 
brief section at once to do. 
1. 
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases aris-
ing under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who 
gave this power, to say that in using it the constitution should not be 
looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be 
decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? 
This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases, then, the 
constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open 
it at all, what part o/it are they forbidden to read or to obey?16 
What part-or what parts-indeed. This question framed so 
trenchantly by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison is 
as pertinent now as when it first appeared in 1803. In a straightfor-
ward sense it not only suitably frames the larger topic with which we 
15. See W.B. Yeats, The Second Comillg. ill THE POEMS 235, 235 (Daniel Albright cd., 1990) 
("And what rough beast, itS hour come round at last, I Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?"). 
16. Marburyv. Madison,S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (Marshall, CJ.) (emphasis added). 
Marshall is addressing the question of the Court's powers and its obligation of constitutional re-
view of acts of Congress. In elaborating the scope of that responsibility, he begins by reciting the 
words of Article Ill, Section 2, ''The judicial Power shall extend to 0/1 Cases ••• arising under this 
Constitution .... " U.S. CONSf. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
8 DUKELAWJOURNAL [Vol. 51:1 
are-or should be-concerned, but also, albeit merely by implication, 
supplies its own answer. If there are any such clauses, where are they? 
If there are, moreover, what makes them so, i.e., what makes these 
crossed out (or unread) clauses the clauses suitable for judges to ig-
nore or treat as of less concern than others?17 
Is the clause that forbids state laws impairing contractual obliga-
tions one of these clauses?18 Or the Fifth Amendment clause that de-
clares there shall be no taking of private property, even for public use, 
without just compensation?19 Or perhaps just the clause, empowering 
Congress to "regulate commerce among the several states," a clause 
occasionally treated by a number of judges and a greater number of 
academics as though some-maybe all-of the last five words of the 
clause had been crossed out?20 
17. So to treat them as of "less concern" than, say, the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment-a clause much like the clauses in Article I, Section 10 (in that it, like each 
of them, is merely another, equally express, constitutionally enacted restriction on what states arc 
permitted-or rather, not permitted-to do). Compare U.S. CONST. amend, XIV, § 1 ("[NJor shall 
any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), wilh /d. 
art. I,'§ 10 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts."). There is assuredly no interest on the part of many attending this con-
ference in dismissing, or exiling, the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, criticism is virtually ununi-
mous of some early decisions of the Supreme Court, in which the Court appeared to do virtually 
that, such as, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540-51 (1896) (sustaining the usc of 
race as a classification in ways merely enforcing standards comporting with prevailing custom and 
usage-as in segregation of seats in public conveyances). The "test" employed by the Court in 
Plessy was merely that of minintum rationality, id. at 550, a standard the state was able to meet 
easily (the law, the state observed, served the general comfort and convenience of passengers 
overall-or so it claimed). Seeing no basis to disagree, the Court permitted the law to stund. Jd. ut 
550-51. So, with that facile rationale, the Clause went into "exile" for another fifty years or so, 
even as the "Contracts Clause," in Article I, Section 10, has now-in Judge Ginsburg's view-bcen 
submitted to much the same sort of fate. 
18. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 1. Evidently, John Marshall thought not. See, c.g" Trs. of Durt· 
mouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819) (Marshall, CJ.) (applying a rigorous 
and expansive view of the Contracts Clause in invalidating New Hampshire legislation); Fletcher v. 
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138-39 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (same in regard to a Gcorgia law); cf. 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443-44 (1934) (discussing the limits of the 
Contracts Clause in emergency situations). The Blaisdell case, with some others, wus mistuken by 
many effectively to read the Clause out of the Constitution. Even now, for example, the most tlllIt 
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress is prepared to suy on the subject is 
this: "It should not be inferred [from the case law since Blaisdell was decided] that the obligation of 
contracts clause is today totally moribund." CONGo REs. SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STAlES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 395 (Johnny H. Killian & 
George A. Costello eds., 1996); sec also supra note 17. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. Or, though not "crossed out," more "suitably explained" so 
that, either way, the power thus given is textually revised as a power effectively without boundu-
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The challenge framed in this way, as it was by Marshall, some-
times appears today in discussions distinguishing justiciable from 
nonjusticiable constitutional clauses and justiciable from nonjusticia-
ble claims. Constitutional claims thought to be justiciable, we com-
monly say, are one and all determinable "on their merits" in the 
courts-they are claims in which judges are expected to "look into" 
the Constitution, claims in which judges are to give a constitutional 
claim its full due to determine the case at hand. Claims of a nonjusti-
ciable kind, on the other hand, are just the opposite. These are claims 
ordinarily conceded to be beyond the ken of courts. Such claims, to 
be sure, are not limited to-but may include-constitutional claims, 
including some claims concededly brought in the requisite form of a 
"case arising under the constitution" (i.e., a "case" between genuinely 
adverse parties, each with much at stake, on highly concrete facts, 
with what is admittedly a serious, substantial, constitutional question 
squarely on point). 
-But despite occasional misunderstandings to the contrary, the 
fact or conclusion that a given kind of constitutional claim is not to be 
determined by a court-that it is nonjusticiable in just this sense of 
not being judicially determinable-does not thereby imply that judges 
regard themselves as empowered "to read [and] to obey" only some 
parts of the Constitution, but not other parts. To the contrary. quite 
often nonjusticiability stands for nearly the opposite-it is a reminder 
that they-the judges-are to read and respect all parts of the Consti-
tution rather than only some parts. 
In brief, obedience to the Constitution by the judges may itself 
consist of recognizing distinctions established within the Constitution, 
including distinctions as to who determines what-that the Constitu-
tion may place certain questions in the hands of others, and not in the 
courts.21 And if that is so, then whenever it is so, and to the extent that 
it is so, the essence of the judicial duty is to declare the law accord-
ries, a more general power of unlimited scope: "Congress shall have power to make laws on any 
subject, and to regulate any subject, in just such manner and degree as Congress decides so to do." 
21. The Court has put the matter well. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr,369 U.s. 186,217 (1962) 
("Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political [i.e., nonjusticiablel question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department .•.. "); id. at 246 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Where the Constitution assigns a particu-
lar function wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary does not inter-
vene."). 
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ingly, accept the Constitution's directive and disengage the Court 
from proceeding any further, even as the Constitution suggests.22 
Of course, it is a nice question how many clauses of this kind, if 
any, the Constitution contains. Very few come labeled as justiciable 
or nonjusticiable as such-actually none do. Still, it may not be diffi-
cult to propose an example or two of a sort that Marshall himself 
might have approved. So, as one such plausible example, consider a 
provision in Section 5 of Article I. The pertinent section provides 
that: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members .... ,,23 
Now, no one, as far as I know, whether in Marshall's day or in 
ours, has suggested that the judges are forbidden to open, read, or 
yield to this part of the Constitution. To the contrary, one would say, 
it is to be "opened," read, and obeyed in the sense of "respected" by 
the courts. Here, however, judicial application of this provision may 
itself direct that judges accept its instruction, i.e., to take that instruc-
tion seriously, give it full faith and credit, and accordingly refer such 
questions as may arise in respect to whether a member of either 
house of Congress possesses the requisite qualifications to serve in 
that house, to the determination of that house. And this may be so, to 
be sure, though the "qualification" is one the Constitution itself pre-
scribes-for example, that a particular person was, "when elected" to 
the House, in fact "an inhabitant of the State in which he or she was 
elected, rather than (as others may contend) an "inhabitant" of some 
other state.24 
In this instance, rather than presuming to empanel a jury in an 
otherwise seemingly appropriate case-to take evidence, hear argu-
ment, and decide, with or without a jury-the court might refer the 
22 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Here, wholly in keeping-rather 
than not in keeping-with Marshall's description of the judicial duty, the judicial department docs 
not evade its duty "to say what the law is." Rather, the judicial department performs its duty to say 
what the law is. It does so simply by saying: "'The law' is that 'whether what x requires is satisfied 
in this case is reserved for Congress to say,' i.e., the law-in this instance the Constitution as 'the 
law'-assigns the power and responsibility to Congress, and not to the courts, to determine all 
cases and controversies of this particular kind." 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cI.l (emphasis added). 
24. The quoted phrase, requiring that one be "an inhabitant" of the state choosing its Repre-
sentatives, and that one be such an inhabitant "when elected," is excerpted from the Constitu-
tion. The clause expressly limits eligibility for serving in the House of Representatives: "No Person 
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been 
seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabiulllt of that 
State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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dispute to the House of Representatives for resolution. And why? 
Perhaps it is simply because the Constitution so suggests or even di-
rects. And if that is so-if that is what the Court is meant to do in 
keeping with the plain sense of this clause-then, as the Court has 
acknowledged, there is nothing amiss. The "judicial duty is not less 
fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising 
firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer."2S Nothing 
Marshall wrote, either in Marbury or elsewhere, suggests that he 
would disagree.26 
Thus, one may likewise raise a proper constitutional challenge on 
the basis, say, that "Representative James Smith lied about his age 
when he filed for election to the House of Representatives. He is in 
fact twenty-three and not twenty-six, as he has claimed. And he is 
thus ineligible to serve in the House." But if judges are right in the 
way they have read the provision in Article I, Section 5, it is for the 
House of Representatives-and not for the courts-to say whether 
the assertion made about Smith has merit, and, if it does, as the 
House may itself so determine, what, if anything, shall be done.v 
Similarly, one might consider the following clause of the Consti-
tution in Article IV, Section 4: "The United States shall guarantee to 
25. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869) (emphasis added). "Jurisdiction" in 
this instance, one would say, is "ungranted" to the courts and instead "granted" by the Constitu-
tion to the Senate and House of Represcntatives, respectively. 
26. See, e.g., Cohens v. Vrrginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 2£». 4(» (1821) (Marshall. CJ.) ("We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given. than to IISllrp thatlVhicll is 
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.to) (emphasis added); see also 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969). Adam Cayton Powell was denied his seat in 
Congress not because-as the House might have determined (but failed to do)-he was not. when 
elected, an actual "inhabitant" of New York (he stayed out of the state execpt on Sundays. to avoid 
service of process), but because of varieties of alleged misconduct during his pre\ious terms in 
Congress. Id. at 489-90. The Supreme Court held that the sole qualifications requisite for election 
to the House are those prescribed in the Constitution, i.e .• those set forth in Article I. Section 2, 
Cause 2; it is therefore just in respect to the three specific qualifications listed in the Constitution 
that the Constitution empowers the House to judge./d. at 550. The House itself therefore lacked 
jurisdiction, in the Court's view, to declare him unqualified. and deny him his seat, on some other 
stated ground such as his alleged misconduct in a previous session of Congress. ItI.; see also US. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 798 (1995) ("[T]he qualifications for service in Con-
gress set forth in the Constitution are 'fixed,' at least in the sense that they may not be supple-
mented by Congress."). 
27. For example, the House might refuse to seat Smith as a member of the House (as lacking 
the requisite qualification by age), or to declare the seat vacant, an action that might then mean 
that a special election would be forthcoming to fill the vacancy. as pro\ided in the Constitution. 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cL 4 ("When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the 
Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. "). 
12 DUKELAWJOURNAL [Vol. 51:1 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.,,28 The 
Supreme Court has "opened" and read this clause, but read it as re-
serving to the political departments of the United States the determi-
nation of whether a state possesses the form of government thus iden-
tified in the clause as the kind of government each state is guaranteed 
(as well as reserving to the political departments what measures to 
take to secure that form of government).29 In brief, the reference to 
"The United States" in Article IV, Section 4, is, on this reading by the 
Court, distinct from another, quite different reference, such as that 
"the Courts of the United States shall guarantee" (or "also" guaran-
tee). It is different as well from one that might declare (as the actual 
clause does not): "The United States, including its courts, shall guar-
antee .... " 
Moreover, to be sure, if this way of reading the clause is correct, 
then given the manner in which the clause confides this particular 
constitutional responsibility to the political departments, it might 
even be within Congress's power to require that states apportion state 
legislative districts (and not merely congressional districts yo according 
to a "Republican" representative principle of "one person, one vote." 
It would not, however, be appropriate for any court to take upon it-
self an authority to employ this clause to do so. To the contrary, one 
might say (as the Court has seemed to say) that the clause forbids the 
courts from taking any such role.3! 
28. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added). 
29. See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon,223 U.S. 118, 134-51 (1912) (determining 
that a state constitutional provision providing for legislation by referendum was political and gov-
ernmental, and therefore outside the reach of the judicial power); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 1,39 (1849) (observing that the question of whether a state's government has been legiti-
mately replaced belongs in the political, not the judicial, sphere). 
30. In the case of congressional districts (as distinct from state legislative districts), the con-
gressional authority to provide for election of House members from districts of equal population 
(or equal numbers of voters) comes from express provision in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4, cI. 1 (stating that Congress may determine the "Manner" of holding congressional elections, 
such as, by single-member districts rather than at large). 
31. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (forcing state legislative reapportionment, but 
relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and observing that "the 
claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability 
is therefore not foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving that clause"); id. at 226-27: 
This case does, in one sense, involve the allocation of political power within a State, and 
the appellants might conceivably have added a claim under the Guaranty Clause. Of 
course, as we have seen, any reliance on that clause would be futile. But because any re-
liance on the Guaranty Clause could not have succeeded it does not follow that appel-
lants may not be heard on the equal protection claim which in fact they tender. 
2001] FOREWORD 13 
To be sure, this reading of the "Guarantee" Clause of Article IV 
is contestable.32 Indeed, it has been contested as one might suspect." 
Still, if one were persuaded that this is a correct understanding of the 
32. It is obviously contestable if only because the Oause does not say that: "1l1e Unitcd 
States, exclusive of Us courts, shall .•.• " Thus, the cxclusion of courts from any active role \\ith 
respect to the Guarantee Oause is at most implied, rathcr than expressed-it is at most a mere 
deduction, "expressio unius, exclusio alterius est." The point was made by Justice Frankfurtcr. in 
his dissent in Baker: "Art. IV, § 4, is not committed by e).llress constitutional tcnns to Congress." 
369 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Fully exploiting Frankfurtcr's observation, Justice 
Douglas went further, to declare his own view that "[t]he statcments in LlIIller ". Bort/en that this 
guaranty is enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is [sic] not maintainable." Iii. at 
242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Douglas would 
have treated claims brought under the Clause as not foreclosed to the courts. 
33. See supra note 29. And in fact, despite the disclaimers, the Court has not always declined 
to hear and decide cases arising under the Clause. See, e.g., Gregor)' v. Ashcroft. SOl U.s. 452. 463 
(1991) (declaring the ability to determine the qualifications of important government officials to be 
at the heart of representative government); Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.s. 506, 519 (1897) (re-
jecting a claim based on the Oause for failure to state a claim, rather than treating it as 
a non justiciable case or controversy or as a matter solely for Congress to decide); Minor v. Happer-
sett, 88 U.S. (21 Wa1l.) 162, 175-76 (1875) (same). 
Additionally, it is plausible to suppose that although the Guarantce Clause does not con-
template an original enforcement power vested in the courts, questions nonetheless may arise 
under that Oause that are fully justiciable. Perhaps a useful (even if merely hypothetical) example 
would be this: an act of Congress forbidding laws "to be enacted in any State directly by initiative 
or referendum, rather than by representatives duly cllosen in eacll State, by the people 
thereof." Here, by claiming power to enact this act pursuant to the Guarantce Clause in Article IV, 
Congress asserts its authority to say what is a "Republican Form of Govcrnment"; contrasts it as 
one distinctive from "direct democracies"; and presumes to make good its obligation to eacl! state 
to guarantee a republican form of government by providing the controlling yardstick. May the 
states thus be forbidden by Congress to share lawmaking power \\ith the people of the state, and 
must they, rather, restrict it-that power to make law-to some "rcprcsentati\'C" electcd few? 
Here, the question-such as it is (and it is far from trivial)-is just what is the latitude of po\\'Cf 
enumerated in Article IV, as vested in the United States? Ho\\'Cvcr uncertain it may be as an origi-
nal proposition, it is surely not "whatever Congress chooses so to declare." 
The question, then, of whether Congress has acted within the scope of the po\\'Cf granted 
it by the Constitution, whether pursuant to Article IV or othcmise, in imposing this "how·to-
make-laws" restriction upon the states, is raised squarely in our hypothctical. Hcre, the courts may 
apply the Act of Congress only if it was enacted "pursuant" to the Constitution and not other-
wise. Nor, in determining that matter may the court just "irrcbuttably presume" that it was, or 
supinely genuflect and "defer to Congress's view" that it was, or-and hcre is the point-least oC 
all treat the question as nonjusticiable per se. We are back to the bedrock of Marbllry \'. Madison 
itself. See also nmFEDERAUSf No. 78, at 467 (Alexandcr Hamilton) (Ointon Rossiter ed., 1961): 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges oC tIIcir 
own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclush'C upon the other 
departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is 
not to be collected from any particular provisions in tile Constitution •••• It is far more 
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermcdiate body between 
the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter \\ithin the 
limits assigned to thcir authority. 
For a recent, welcome review of this very issue, see generally William Mayton, Direct DemocraC}~ 
Federalism & the GUllrantee Clause,2 GREEN BAG 269 (1999). 
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Clause (i.e., a reading that gives it "full faith and credit"-its full and 
exact due-neither more nor less), then one would not complain that 
the courts had placed the Clause in exile. The Constitution, we would 
say in reference to this Clause, is emphatically not in exile.34 Rather, it 
has been merely respected by the judges, even as one should want 
them to do.35 
And, briefly, then, to state the basic proposition in a manner that 
must by now be all too obvious-so ought the judges to do generally 
as they go about their work. Exactly insofar as judges succeed in that 
task (for this is the judicial task) they cannot be accused of having 
sent any part of the Constitution into exile. Or, rather, though judges 
may be accused, we should, upon our own reading of the relevant ma-
terial, be able simply to say whether the accusation is misplaced. And 
so, to return one more time to John Marshall's challenge, one will be 
satisfied that the clause in question (whichever it may be) will not 
have gone unread. Neither, if the judges are performing their task 
properly, will any parts have been underread, nor overread, in the 
manner Judge Ginsburg faults in his critique.36 When, on the other 
hand, one may be persuaded that the Constitution has been treated 
disdainfully in any of its salient parts, that one would seek those parts' 
return from exile seems scarcely surprising, much less cause for ridi-
cule, and even less for excited expressions of dismay or of alarm. Nor 
is the notion merely one partisan to Judge Ginsburg's particular selec-
tion of arguably "exiled" parts-that is, the various structural and 
34. If one were still to speak of the Constitution being in exile, it could be only in some differ-
ent respect, not as a criticism of the judges, but rather as a criticism of the political departments, for 
their unwillingness to take appropriate measures to fuIfill the "guarantee" made to the states (such 
as what one regards the nature of the guarantee to have been). Here, however, I do not take the 
question of the "constitution in exile" as directed to these different kinds of alleged defaults, l.c., 
those of the political departments rather than those of the courts, although a public law conference 
on that subject would be eminently suitable to hold. 
35. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[A]nd all ... judicial Officers, both of the United States 
and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support tltis Constitu· 
tion .... ") (emphasis added). Here, one would say, one exactly supports "this Constitution" by 
recognizing in one's judicial role the manner in which this Constitution reserves certain issues as 
appropriate for resolution elsewhere than in the courts. 
36. So-just to illustrate these terms-Judge Ginsburg clearly believes that the provision in 
Article I, Section 10 (prohibiting state laws impairing the obligations of contracts) has been "un-
derread," just as he believes, too, that the provision in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 ("To regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States.") has in turn been overread (i.e., "overread" to confer 
virtually unlimited power on Congress; thus overread in a manner utterly at odds with the Framers' 
design as well as with the limiting language of the clause itself). Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 83-87. 
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substantive clauses identified in his review." Rather, it is exactly what 
one should seek to do, whether as a judge or as an academic, and 
without regard to the complaints others may raise, whether from the 
left or from the right. 
n. 
Indeed, in the remaining pages of this Foreword, I should want to 
try to sustain the suggestion, just offered, that no constitutional provi-
sion should be in exile, in the context of a clause I think has suffered 
that fate. The clause I have in mind appears in Article m of the Con-
stitution. After giving Congress power, including an express power to 
establish an array of federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court,~ 
and providing that the jurisdiction of these federal courts could, if 
Congress so willed, extend to "all Cases ... arising under ... the Laws 
of the United States,,,39 Article m provides however: 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any 
State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may 
by Law have directed.40 
37. So, for example, a number of notable writers focus on doctrines and clauses in the Consti-
tution very different from those that are featured in Judge Ginsburg's book re\;ew. Where Gins-
burg's are typically identified (as he suggests) with the Constitution of "liberty," Ginsburg. slIpra 
note 5, at 84, other writers' selections include other clauses. words, phrases, and preambles. in 
which they find a strong countervailing Constitution, that of "community," and of mutual support 
and concern. The object of their writing is to suggest a Constitution of "positi\·c rights" and (even) 
of enforceable "entitlement to"-rather than (merely) "freedom from"-<crtain things (e.g., an 
entitlement to welfare, to a minimum level of support, education, police protection, health care, 
work, etc., the means without which "freedom" is for them merely a Hobbesian freedom of ne-
glect, of want, of sickness, and of malnutrltion-a freedom to be unequal. as it were). See, e.g .. 
Amy L Wax, Redzinking Welfare Rigllts: Reciprocity NOnllS, Reacti~'e Allitlltles, ami tile Political 
Economy of Welfare Refonn, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 258-59 nn. 6, 7 (Wintcr/Spring 
2000) (referencing numerous authors and sources that discuss these issues). Many (I include my-
self) find nothing to sustain these writers' claims (that tlley ha\'e recaptured what these clauses 
were meant to do and how they were meant to apply), but that is beside the point. Indeed, were 
one persuaded-whether by these writers or whether by still better sources for resolving one's 
uncertainties-that these were "lost" or "exiled" (or "underread") parts of the Constitution, there 
would be nothing amiss in their being "brought in from the cold." For, here too, c\'Cn as Justice 
Frankfurter once observed, albeit in a somewhat different setting: "WISdom too orten never comes, 
and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late." Henslee v. Union Planters Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S, 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
39. Id. art. III, § 2, cI.1. 
40. Id. art. III, § 2, c13. 
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When this provision came to be considered in state ratification con-
ventions, some thought it too weak a safeguard.41 On the one hand, it 
made no guarantee of the right to trial by jury in civil cases.42 And 
even in criminal trials, where the right was now to be safeguarded-
not subject to congressional discretion to disallow or to abridge but, 
instead, constitutionally guaranteed-the assurance was troublesome 
to some, such as George Mason and Patrick Henry, who spoke to the 
point in the course of the Virginia ratification debates. For example, 
Henry objected that although the trial of any crime would need to be 
held in the state where the said crime was committed, it evidently 
might be held anywhere in the state, though the place selected be re-
mote from the place of the alleged crime and remote, too, from the 
district of the accused's residence. In brief, a clause that permitted 
Congress to vest power in federal prosecutors to situate a trial any-
where within a state (perhaps a place willfully picked, where jurors 
would be indifferent to the fate of the defendant charged with a fed-
eral crime) was thought to be too permissive to provide a guarantee 
of trial by jury in a truly meaningful way.43 George Mason thought the 
provision too weak in an additional respect, which he raised by way of 
a question: 
This great palladium of national safety, which is secured to us by our 
own government, will be taken away from us in those courts; or, if it 
be reserved, it will be but in name, and not in substance. In the gov-
ernment of Virginia, we have secured an impartial jury of the vici-
nage. We can except to jurors, and peremptorily challenge them in 
criminal trials. If I be tried in the federal court for a crime which 
may affect my life, have I a right of challenging or excepting to the 
jury? .... This sacred right ought, therefore, to be secured.44 
41. I FEDERALISTS AND ANTlFEDERALlSTS-THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITtmON 120, 127, 129-32, 135 (John Kaminski & Richard LeIDer eds., 1989). 
42. A defect, as it was seen to be, corrected in the framing of what became the Seventh 
Amendment: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law. . 
U.S. CONSf. amend. VII. 
43. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OFTIIE FEDERAL CONSTInmON 545 (Jonathan 
Elliot ed., 1996) (remarks of Patrick Henry) ("Juries from the vicinage being not secured, this right 
is in reality sacrificed."). 
44. Id. at 528 (remarks of George Mason). 
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The point that the jury provision in Article ill did not limit where a 
federal criminal prosecution might be brought (other than that it be 
somewhere within the state where the crime was committed), eventu-
ally carried over to produce a more specific, more limiting clause in 
the Sixth Amendment.45 As to the objections that Mason and Henry.:6 
made to the Jury Guarantee Clause in Article ill-on the ground that 
it did not explicitly spell out the familiar law of challenges, both for 
cause and peremptory, however, James Madison demurred: 
He [George Mason] is displeased that there is no provision for per-
emptory challenges to juries. There is no such provision made in our 
Constitution or laws.47 The answer made by an honorable member 
lately is a full answer to this. He said, and with great propriety and 
truth, that where a technical word was used, all the incidents be-
longing to it necessarily attended it. The right of challenging is inci-
dent to the trial by jury, and therefore, as the one is secured, so is 
the other.48 
Madison's reference to the "technical word" of trial by jury, as in-
cluding the "incidents belonging to it," is drawn from William Black-
stone's Commentaries, as Madison specifically adverted at the Vir-
ginia convention in another colloquy with Patrick Henry that same 
day, June 18, 1788.49 The relevant passages from Blackstone strongly 
confirm Madison's representations regarding the entitlements to per-
emptory challenge, as well as challenge for cause: 
45. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed •••• J' 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
46. E.g.,3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OFlHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, slIpra note 43, at 
542 (remarks of Patrick Henry) (describing the right to challenge potential jurors to be as valuable 
as the right of trial by jury). 
47. What Madison is saying here is that although Mason is correcl-that the state constitu-
tion's bill of rights does indeed secure the right of peremptory challenge (as well as challenge for 
cause) in criminal cases-it is because of the provision guaranteeing trial by jury as such (i.e .. that 
the right of peremptory challenge is an implied, incidental feature of the state constitutional 
clause), which is equally the case in respect to Article III. 
48. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, slIpra note 43, at S3O-
31 (remarks of James Madison); see also id. at 546 (remarks oC Edmund Pendleton) ("Il is strongly 
insisted that the privilege of challenging, or excepting to the jury, is not secured. When the Consti-
tution says that the trial shall be by jury, does it not say that e\'ery incident \\ill go along \\ith it?"). 
49. lei. at 501 (remarks ofJames Madison) ("r \vill refer you to a book which is in every man's 
hand-Blackstone's Commentaries."); see also United States v. Wood, 299 U.s. 123, 138 (1936) 
("Undoubtedly, as we have frequently said, the framers of the Constitution were familiar with 
Blackstone'S Commentaries. Many copies of the work had been sold here and it was generally 
regarded as the most satisfactory ex-position of the common law oC England. "). 
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When the trial is called on, the jurors are to be sworn, as they 
appear, to the number of twelve, unless they are challenged by the 
party. 
Challenges may here be made ... on the part of ... the prisoner; 
and either to the whole array, or to the separate polls, for the very 
same reasons that they may be in civil causes. For it is here at least 
as necessary, as there ... that the particular jurors be omni excep-
tione majores; not liable to objection either propter honoris respec-
tum, propter defectum . .. or propter delictum. 
Challenges upon any of the foregoing accounts are styled chal-
lenges for cause; which may be without stint in both criminal and 
civil trials. But in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is, 
in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious 
species of challenge to a certain number of jurors, without shewing 
any cause at all; which is called a peremptory challenge: a provision 
full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our 
English laws are justly famous.so 
And Blackstone then discussed the number of peremptory challenges 
secured to the accused in all felony cases as a matter of right-
namely, twenty peremptory challenges, down from the earlier, larger 
number of thirty-five. He declared, "For the law judges that [the rules 
regarding peremptory challenges] are fully sufficient to allow the 
most timorous man to challenge through mere caprice."SI But he 
noted, too, the asymmetry between the prosecution and the prisoner 
in respect to peremptory challenges and in contrast with challenges 
for cause. So, he observed: "This privilege, of peremptory challenges, 
though granted to the prisoner, is denied to the king by the statute 33 
Edw. r. st. 4. which enacts that the king shall challenge no jurors with-
out assigning a cause certain, to be tried and approved by the 
court."S2 
Wholly in keeping with these understandings, moreover, the first 
acts of Congress applicable to federal court criminal trials were ex-
50. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSfONE, COMMENTARIES *346 ("Public Wrongs"). 
51. Jd. at *347. 
52 Jd.; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 243 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) 
("[A]lthough the Crown at early common law had an unlimited number of peremptory challenges, 
as early as 1305 that right was taken away, and since that time in England peremptories may be 
exercised only by the defendant."). 
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actly in accord with these views.53 What one may reasonably suggest 
from this is that in the subsequent elaborations respecting trial by jury 
(both criminal and civil), as framed in the Bill of Rights, principally in 
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, the text of those provisions re-
flected either specific changes, specific additions, or specific clarifica-
tions. Where, however, there was no apparent misunderstanding or 
uncertainty as to what the provision in Article ill itself provided, no 
change would be necessary. 
So, for a good and uncontroversial example, one finds no lan-
guage in the Sixth Amendment expressly providing that the verdict of 
the federal court criminal jury be unanimous (i.e., no language pre-
53. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 119: 
And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons be indicted oC treason against 
the United States, and shall stand mute or reCuse to plead, or shall challenge perempto-
rily above the number of thirty-five of the jwy, or if any person or persons be indicted of 
any other of the offences herein before set Corth, Cor which the punishment is declared 
to be death, if he or they shall also stand mute or will not answer to the indictment. or 
challenge peremptorily above the number of twenty persons of the jwy, the court, in 
any of the cases aforesaid, shall notwithstanding proceed to the trial of the person or 
persons so standing mute or challenging, as if he or they had pleaded not guilty •••• 
The number of peremptory challenges affirmatively authorized by Congress never has been re-
duced to fewer than twenty in capital cases, and to this extent reOects a completely consistent 
treatment of its usage in Blackstone's day as well. The basic changes, for the most part, ha\'C been 
those that granted, and then gradually ex-panded, the authorization of peremptory challenges al-
lowed to the government, first permitting it five such challenges, Act of June 8, Ur12, ch. 333, 17 
Stat. 282, then moving it to six, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1167, and eventually all the 
way to twenty in capital cases (the same number as is provided for an accused person facing death 
at the hands of the state). FED. R. CUM. P.24{b). 
Of course, no one has claimed (nor could they reasonably claim) that the gOl'enunenr has 
a "constitutional" right of peremptory challenge. Thus, neither its e1imination, reduction, or limita-
tion in its uses, would frame any particular constitutional distress. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, Sl1 US. 
127, 129 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection aause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
state prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to e1iminate jurors on the basis of sex); Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (barring prosecutors from using their peremptory challenge 
authority to exclude potential jurors based on race, a decision which overruled, in part, Swain, 380 
U.S. at 221-22, where the Court had presumed that the prosecutor properly exercised the state's 
challenges without violating constitutional limits). The emphasis in both cases, BalSon andJ.E.B .. is 
on the use of state power to compose a jury stripped of persons oC the defendant's race or 5C.'t, a 
device forbidden to the state legislature acting directly, and a device Iike\\ise forbidden though it 
acts indirectly, ie., through the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, 10 achieve the same 
end. Cf. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (extending BalSol/, but in no untoward 'way, in 
finding standing in the criminal defendant to object to the prosecutor's use oC peremptories 10 
eliminate jurors by race, which jurors the deCendant may believe to be beneficial if not dismissed, 
though not of the same race as himself). The emphasis in POlI'ers remains an emphasis on the 
state's use of peremptories, not the accused's use. See id. at 408 ("Whether jury senice be deemed 
a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to 
others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminale in the offering and \\ithholding of the 
elective franchise."). 
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venting Congress from undercutting the guarantee of trial by jury by 
authorizing a determination of "guilty" by less than the full jury).S4 
Nor, for that matter, does one find language that the jury must be of 
twelve, rather than some lesser number of persons (i.e., preventing 
Congress from further undercutting the guarantee of tdal by jury by 
the simple expedient of making the jurors but two or three, or any 
number less than twelve, while simultaneously eliminating the re-
quirement of unanimity of verdict).ss That these assurances are obvi-
ously at least as vital as some lesser ones spelled out in the Sixth 
Amendment (e.g., that the tdal be held not just within the state, but 
also within the distdct, wherein the crime shall have been committed) 
would appear to be self-evident. That they are not "spelled out" in 
the Sixth Amendment does not imply they are omitted from the Con-
stitution. Rather, that they were not spelled out gratuitously in that 
Amendment, one may well suppose, merely reflects the understand-
ing that they already were taken into account, implicitly, as part-and-
parcel of the original provision in Article IILS6 As Madison suggested, 
without further dissent by Mason or by Henry, in the Virginia de-
bates: "where a technical word was used, all the incidents belonging 
to it necessarily attended it."s7 A jury of twelve, in all felony cases, 
was well established.s8 So, too, was the settled requirement of verdict 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
55. Id. 
56. Cf Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-71 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (concluding 
that although unanimity of jury verdict is not provided for in either the Article III provision or the 
Sixth Amendment, unanimity is required in all federal criminal prosecutions, and that "in amend-
ing the Constitution to guarantee the right to jury trial, the framers desired to prcserve the jury 
safeguard as it was known to them at common law"); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406, 407 
n.2 (1972) (decIining to regard the unanimity requirement as applicable to the states via the mere 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and sustaining noncapital felony verdicts of ten 
of twelve jurors). 
In Apodaca, the Court suggested that it was only in the latter half of the fourteenth cen-
tury that "it became settled that a verdict had to be unanimous." Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2. 
"Only?" One surely would have thought that a feature unexceptionally identified to a certain insti-
tution for centuries easily would fit the bill as understood, part-and-parcel thereof. See Petcr Sper-
Iich, Trial by Jury: It May Have a Future, 1978 SUP. Cr. REV. 191, 197 ("To produce this ruling [in 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970), which permitted juries of as few as six], the Court ar-
guably had to discard about 700 years of common law and 200 years of American constitutionl11 
history."). 
57. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra notc 43. at 531 
(remarks of James Madison). 
58. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 67-68 (1970) (overturning 11 conviction for "jos-
tling" secured without a jury trial); see also Williams, 399 U.S. at 122 (Harll1n. J., dissenting): 
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unanimity.59 And so, too, "the right of challenging," not just for cause, 
but also peremptorily.(,() This was a challenge the accused possessed, 
"an arbitrary and capricious species of challenges," albeit only to a 
certain limited number. This right, moreover, was not subject to ques-
tion; rather, it was a right to be deployed exclusively as the accused 
might find best, against the terror of criminal conviction and the full 
weight of the prosecutorial state.6l 
The principal case law today, to be sure, is very much to the con-
trary.62 Indeed, one of the most frequently repeated statements perti-
nent to this subject appears in Stilson v. United States,") in just the 
following quite emphatic terms: 
With all respect, I consider that before today it would have been unthinkable to suggest 
that the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial by jury is satisfied by a jwy of six, or less. as 
is left open by the Court's opinion in Williams, or by less than a unanimous "erdict •••• 
fd. at 124 ("[S]ound constitutional interpretation requires, in my .. ie\\" fIXing the federal jury as it 
was known to the common law."); id. at 126 ("Can it be doubted that a unanimous jwy of 12 pro-
vides a greater safeguard than a majority vote of six?"); Hans ZCisel, ••• Anti Then There Were 
None: The Diminution a/the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L REv. 710, 719-20 (1971) (explaining how 
the twelve·person jury provides a criminal defendant significantly greater security than a jury of 
six). 
59. See supra note 56. 
60. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text 
61. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212, 219 (1965) (dictum) ("The peremptory challenge 
has very old credentials .•.. The persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate 
the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury •••• 
The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error witllout a sho\\ing of prejudice."); Pointer 
v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894): 
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without sho\\ing cause is one of the 
most important of the rights secured to the accused. ..• Any system for the empanclling 
of a jury that ... embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right 
must be condemned. 
Cf. 4 BLACKSfONE, supra note 50, at *352 (summarizing tlle general .. ie\\, of criminal punishment 
that Blackstone saw reflected in the common law of England). Bloody as that system generally 
was--and it surely was (most felonies were punishable by death)-this was the \iew Blackstone 
declared was the philosophy of criminal trials: "the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty per-
sons escape, than that one innocent suffer." fd. 
62 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 3<», 3(J] (2000) (reaffirming that 
peremptory challenges are not of "constitutional dimension," but merely "one means to achieve 
the constitutionally required end of an impartial jury"); Ross v. Oklalloma, 487 U.s. 81, 88 (1988) 
(same); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 663 (1987) ("Peremptory challenges are not of constitu· 
tional origin."); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,145 (1936) (declaring that tbe number of 
peremptory challenges parties arc to receive should be regulated by Congress or by the common 
law). 
63. 250 U.S. 583 (1919). 
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There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which re-
quires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in 
criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.64 
Yet, it is interesting to note that in Stilson itself, as in virtually every 
other case in which this statement-or some close variation thereof-
appears, the telling reference of the Court is nearly always solely to 
the Sixth Amendment, nothing more. And, indeed, if one confines 
oneself to the text of the Sixth Amendment-if one exiles the sepa-
rate, strong, original clause as it appears, unchanged from Article III, 
by leaving it either unread, or, if you will, underread-then it is easy 
enough to agree with the Court. If one considers only the Sixth 
Amendment's syntax, and confines oneself strictly to its phrases, one 
may easily say that "trial by an impartial jury" is "all that is secured." 
In which case, if the government could save time and money by 
empanelling a jury of three, then so long as that panel were consti-
tuted in a manner not partial to the government (albeit not partial 
either to the accused), the requirement of the Sixth Amendment also 
is met. Furthermore, if the government permits this "impartial jury" 
of three to convict by a simple majority vote, even where the conse-
quence is death, then one can declare with equal equanimity that "the 
accused" shall have "enjoy[ ed] the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury," which, again, is all the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides by way of constitutional guarantee. 
Perhaps it is. But perhaps, also, in thinking this way about the 
Sixth Amendment, something has been left out of mind, as out of 
sight. If one thought that there was this other clause, the first one, the 
original, still embedded in Article III, with an accompanying pedigree 
of its own, one might understand that exiled provision on jury trials in 
different terms than mere "impartiality" -terms less antiseptic, terms 
cast from a history of criminal trials, and terms responsive to under-
standable human fears. These were terms actually meant to be tilted 
in several ways for the predicament of the accused; terms more in 
keeping with the philosophy Blackstone claimed was central to com-
64. Id. at 586. But note, of course, the assumption built into this statement, namely, that if 
there is nothing in the Constitution "which requires Congress to grant" peremptory challenges, 
then, insofar as Congress elects not to grant any, that ends the matter; the assumption being that a 
defendant-even a capital defendant-must invoke some act of Congress as the source of a benefi-
cial feature of trial "by jury"-and not merely some provision in the Constitution "standing alone." 
But why would one suppose this to be true? If one were to believe Madison's answer to Mason and 
to Henry, it is not true. Whether Congress is so "required" Of not, one would say, the right de-
scends not-{)f not just-from any such act, but from the provision "as is," i.e., as it is in Article Ill. 
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mon law: that, while others may disagree, "the law holds, that it is bet-
ter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer. ,t6S 
As it is, however, the Court has reached the point where it treats 
the state and the accused with an altogether withering equality. As 
the state may not, acting through its prosecutor, seek the displace-
ment of a provisionally seated juror on grounds the state legislature 
could not itself use to determine that person's fitness to serve on a 
particular jury (e.g., the person's sex or race), neither may the person 
whose fate is at stake in the trial be permitted to do SO.66 As the state 
cannot use a peremptory challenge to displace from the jury box a 
prospective female juror, in order that the next juror to be called (a 
man) might instead be seated in a death-penalty case, so, likewise, we 
are now advised neither may the person on trial for his life use a per-
emptory challenge to displace from the jury box a prospective male 
juror, in order that the next numbered juror to be called (a woman) 
might instead be seated.67 What a nice symmetry this provides. 
65. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at *352. 
66. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (stressing that potentialjufors ha\'C a right 
guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause not to be excluded on the basis of gender); Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendants from using peremptory chal· 
lenges based on race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,5OO U.S. 614,616 (1991) (prohibiting 
private civil litigants from using peremptory challenges based on race). 
67. Of course, in using a peremptory challenge to displace a male juror in order that the next 
person (a woman) be seated, a hypothetical capital defendant may be making a mistake; for all he 
knows, the woman whose presence he seeks on his capital jury will in fact be more sanguinary than 
he supposes. But what of that? It is this very matter that is for the accused and his or her counsel to 
decide (ie., it is the right to take this chance that is the very heart of the right). 
Consider also the right to vote, to serve on a city council, on a board of county commis-
sioners, as a state legislator, or as governor. Is this "right to vote" merely a "state-delegated" power 
one is authorized to use as a mere agent of the state, a means of "aiding the state," to choose those 
who will serve in office? If so, then it is logical to suppose that it may not be used 10 keep one from 
office, or used to prefer another for office, just because of race or sex. Accordingly, whenever it is 
ascertainable that any votes cast in a given precinct plainly reflecl "racial" or "gender" bloc voting. 
such ballots should be disallowed. Only a vole cast reflecting no "prejudice" on the voter'S part 
should count. To permit any other kind of vote 10 count, one would say, is 10 engage "stale action" 
(if not in the casting of that vote by the voter, then in the stale's "counting" of-i.e., of giving baUOI 
box effect to-any such vote), in a way the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments forbid, insofar 
as it operates to keep some well-qualified candidates from being elected. "nle slale," one should 
say, "sinlply may not 'count' (ie., give effect to) allY such VOle." 
To be sure, determining which votes were thus "inIpem!issibly based" such tbat they must 
be thrown out may be more difficult in election environments than in jury-selcction emironments. 
But if that is all there is to say, it is not very inIpressive, for there are assuredly reasonable means of 
"getting at the truth." If, by way of example, upon a prima facie sho\\ing of "possible sex- or race· 
based" use of a peremptory challenge, the defendant can be put to an examination (10 explain it 
away), there seems little reason to excuse voters whose precinct ballot boxes presenl a strong 
prima facie case of "possible sex- or race-based" voting from aocounting for Iheir voles in some fair 
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Moreover, that the jury the accused confronts happens (by 
chance) to be nearly or even wholly "all male" presumably cannot 
matter, for in seeking to displace a juror already in the box, the ac-
cused-equally with the prosecutor-may not, if one takes the 
Court's current view at face value, draw any inferences based 
"merely" on sex. Indeed, under the current view, the Court has cho-
sen to regard the defendant as little more than a "designated agent of 
the state," merely one who assists the state in composing a jury, not a 
person with a life-and-death interest diametrically opposed to the 
state's interests. The following Wiley Miller cartoon68 tells us how far 
we have come. 
{7(;R\-\Wb '{oUR \loONoR (OO\..\/ 
{Nf,\~ -me 00R'< \0 \-PLP 
Yb'NN 1\-\t; AA~~I:R\N":, ~\l.. 
AFTGR pt:.L\go;;.R~\\oi'\f, .•• 
wiley@non-sequilur.com ""'by __ ~" www.non-sequilur.com 
measure as well. In the end, one may as well recognize that what is at issue here is not the difficulty 
of the inquisition, such as it may be. What is at issue here is one's idea of to what the individual's 
"right" to vote extends. 
68. Non Sequitur © 2000 Wiley Miller. Dist. By UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE. Re-
printed with permission. All rights reserved. 
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Something is missing from this picture, and something is missing 
from the Supreme Court's current direction, something in exile, 
something dimly remembered-back in Article ill, a provision appli-
cable (at least) to criminal trials in our federal courts, something lost 
and very much in the cold. 
CONCLUSION 
In worrying aloud about respecting the seemingly solid phalanx 
of judicial utterances and conventional constitutional wisdom that 
seems now to hold that any provision in our law enabling those ac-
cused of crime to have even one right of peremptory challenge, even 
in death-penalty cases, is solely a matter of legislative grace,ttI and not 
contemplated by the Constitution itself-a position 1 think deeply 
wrong,70 -I have but tried to locate at least one clause congenial to 
the notion of the "Constitution in exile." That theme, best expressed 
two centuries ago by Justice Marshall (well before Judge Ginsburg 
brought it back), is the important matter. Marshall expressed that 
theme in a manner that 1 do not think can be improved upon, and so 1 
return to his formulation once more. Recall that Marshall began by 
referring to the Constitution itself: "The judicial power of the United 
States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution.'t1I And 
so: 
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in 
using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a case 
arising under the constitution should be decided without examining 
the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be 
maintained. In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked 
into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are 
they forbidden to read or to obey?72 
What part, or what parts, indeed. 1 think there is no such part. To be 
sure, it may be difficult to determine what it means to obey the Con-
stitution in a particular case, but that is the challenge to be met-to 
be sorted out as best one can, neither more nor less. The challenge is 
69. And thus it may be taken away whenever Congress or a state legislature finds it useful to 
do so. 
70. Or, if this seems too strong for the reader, merely on the strength of the slim materials in 
Part II of this Foreword, at least it is not "obviously correct." 
71. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (Mnrshnll, CJ.). 
72 ld. at 179 (emphasis added). 
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neither to figure out how to give some provision or clause more 
sweep or scope than is its due nor to figure out how to give some 
vexing clause less efficacy than plainly would appear to be required. 
Rather, each is an abdication, although they are different kinds of ab~ 
dications. Such conduct is not what judges who take an oath "to sup~ 
port this Constitution" should feel free to do. 
